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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the actors and their interests behind the "National 
Guard Empowerment Act," initiated by Congress in 2006 to enhance Guard 
influence in Department of Defense (DoD) budget and strategy decisions 
concerning homeland defense and civil support.   Despite the Guard’s primary 
role as the military’s first responder to domestic terrorist events and natural 
disasters, as a component of the Air Force and Army it has typically been at a 
disadvantage in the competition for resources.  Senate and House sponsors 
initiated Empowerment Act legislation to strengthen the Guard's "bureaucratic 
muscle" in Pentagon budget debates to ensure domestic missions are given 
higher consideration and priority.  Employing concepts from “new 
institutionalism,” specifically the principal-agent frameworks developed by Peter 
Feaver and Deborah Avant, it can be argued that Congressional efforts to pass 
the Empowerment Act are not motivated solely by national security 
considerations, but also electoral incentives and to foster interservice rivalry as a 
monitoring mechanism on DoD decision-making.  Finally, by giving the National 
Guard more autonomy in managing core domestic roles, the Empowerment Act 
may have long-term implications for “Total Force” integration, suggesting it is 
necessary to reconceptualize these longstanding policies.                
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IMPORTANCE 
At a time when we are asking more of the National Guard both at 
home and abroad, its effectiveness is hampered by Cold War 
structures and a lack of institutional power within the Pentagon.1   
The National Guard's importance to U.S. national security has risen 
considerably since the end of the Cold War period but especially in the post 9/11 
threat environment.  In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
11,000 Guardsmen were activated within hours to assist state and federal law 
enforcement in protecting critical infrastructure sites, securing 440 airports,2 and 
supporting continental air defense missions.3   Between September 2001 and 
May 2007, 238,860 Guardsmen deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan,4 and during 
one period in 2005, Army National Guardsmen comprised 40 percent of the U.S. 
Army’s presence in Iraq.5  Guard participation was equally crucial on the 
domestic front when 50,000 members were activated for Hurricane Katrina 
response in 2005 and another 6,000 deployed a year later to patrol the 
Southwest U.S. border in support of Operation Jump Start.6   Admiral Edmund 
                                            
1 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Second Report to Congress, March 1, 
2007, iv,  http://www.cngr.gov/Worddocs/March 1 Report/CNGR Second Report to Congress .pdf 
(accessed May 27, 2007).  
2 Ibid., v. 
3 General John Corley, AF Vice Chief of Staff in written testimony to the House Armed 
Services Committee indicated that "since 9/11, 44,000 fighter or refueling airborne early warning 
sorties had been flown in defense of the United States and nearly 80 percent of those were 
National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces" (prepared statement for the House Armed 
Services Committee on H.R. 5200, June 13, 2006).  
4 Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne O’Bryant, National Guard Personnel and Deployments:  
Fact Sheet, CRS Report RS22451 (updated July 20, 2007), 5. 
5 Steven Blum, “On the Cutting Edge at Home and Overseas in 2006 and Beyond,” The 
Officer 81, 10 (December 2005): 48-52. 
6 Admiral E.P. Giambastiani Jr, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared 
statement to the House Armed Services Committee on the National Defense Enhancement and 
National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 13, 2006. 
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Giambastiani, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) summarized the 
Guard’s value as a force multiplier while testifying before the House Armed 
Services Committee in June 2006, “Simply stated, we could not execute our 
missions across the Department of Defense in this world today without the 
National Guard and Reserve.”7    
However, despite the Guard’s demonstrated worth in domestic homeland 
defense and overseas combat operations, congressional leaders, governors and 
adjutants general are dissatisfied that the level of direct Guard participation in 
DoD strategic decision making and interagency coordination has not kept pace 
with the Guard’s expanding roles and missions.8  Congress and state governors 
are also concerned that Guard effectiveness in traditional domestic missions, 
such as support to civil authorities and disaster response, is being systematically 
eroded due to a lack of influence within the Pentagon in budget and 
programming channels.   
B. NATIONAL DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT AND NATIONAL GUARD 
EMPOWERMENT ACT OF 2006 
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has struggled to adapt itself in 
addressing new threats associated with radical Islamism and transnational 
terrorism.9  The 2006 National Security Strategy highlighted the need for 
organizational change to meet new threats observing, “major institutions of 
                                            
7 See Congressional transcripts from the House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the 
National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006, 109th Cong., 
2nd sess., June 13, 2006   
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001587/HASC-
NG%20ENHANCEMENT%20TRANSCRIPTS.pdf (accessed 4 November 2007). 
8 See prepared testimonies for House Armed Services Committee, June 13, 2006 for Major 
General Francis D. Vavala, Vice President AGAUS, and Brigadier General (ret) Stephen M. 
Koper, President NGAUS; see Congressional transcripts from House Armed Services Committee 
Hearings on National Guard Enhancement, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 13, 2006; Lieutenant 
General H. Steven Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau,  testimony before the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves (CNGR), Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, 
January 31, 2007; Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Second Report to Congress, 
March 1, 2007. 
9 Max Boot, “Send the State Department to War,” The New York Times, November 14, 2007, 
A23. 
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American national security were designed in a different era to meet different 
requirements. All of them must be transformed.”10  In the momentum for 
“transformation,” Congress and state officials have also called for institutional 
reforms in the Guard to ensure it fully participates in Pentagon decisions 
impacting homeland defense and civil support missions.  Reform advocates 
argue the Pentagon has not given adequate attention to domestic security issues 
and that stronger Guard influence is needed to balance the Pentagon's 
predominant focus on the "away game" of overseas campaigns, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan.11 Advocates point to declining Guard equipment inventories as one 
consequence of overwhelming demands of overseas operations, with 
approximately “88 percent of the non-deployed Army National Guard units 
reporting ‘not operationally ready’ due to equipment shortfalls.’”12  Declining 
inventories have a further cascading effect on unit readiness levels since non-
deployed personnel cannot adequately train or support domestic response while 
equipment remains overseas.  A recent report from a Defense Science Board 
Task Force also examined concurrent strains on Guard personnel readiness 
resulting from increased overseas rotations and concluded that current manning 
levels could not sustain projected deployment schedules,  
…today’s Army active, National Guard and Reserve force structure 
will not support DoD’s dwell time policy of one year…mobilized and 
five years not mobilized (1:5) for the reserve components.  End 
strength increases currently authorized will not be sufficient to meet 
the established goals.13 
Documented reports of Guard equipment shortages and higher 
operational tempo, a confused state and federal response to Hurricane Katrina, 
                                            
10 The White House, The National Security Strategy, March 2006, 29. 
11 Christine E. Wormuth. The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report.  Washington, DC:  Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, July 2006, 64. 
12 Defense Science Board Task Force. Deployment of Members of the National Guard and 
Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism. Washington, DC:  Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2007, 19.  
13 Ibid., vii. 
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controversial Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, and lack of 
confidence in DoD’s commitment to providing military assistance to civil 
authorities has pressed Congress to take action.14 Senators Patrick Leahy and 
Kit Bond introduced the “National Defense Enhancement and National Guard 
Empowerment Act” in April 2006 as one aspect of a broader mandate to review 
and recommend improvements to Reserve Component "organization, training, 
equipment, compensation and support to best meet the national security 
requirements of the United States."15   Empowerment legislation was originally 
intended to address Guard "missions to authorities gap" in three key areas:  by 
promoting the Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB) to the rank of full general and 
placing this position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); giving the National Guard 
"more budget authority…to research, develop and procure equipment" to support 
homeland security and other domestic roles; and designating a Guard general as 
Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to ensure the 
Command has the “requisite expertise” for coordinating military responses to 
domestic emergencies.16  The Senators also explained that formalizing National 
Guard interaction with the JCS and Secretary of Defense ensures state 
governors have a more direct channel of communication to the Pentagon.  
Senators Leahy and Bond’s purpose in introducing the legislation is to “give the 
National Guard the institutional muscle commensurate with the Guard’s 
missions” based on its increasing importance in domestic response.17 
Representative Tom Davis along with five other members of the House Armed 
Service Committee introduced identical legislation in the House stating,  
                                            
14  Senators Kit Bond and Patrick Leahy, “Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint 
Resolutions,” Introduction of S.2658, April 26, 2006   
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001465/STATEMENTS%20ON
%20INTRODUCED%20BILLS%20AND%20JOINT%20RESOLUTIONS.pdf  (accessed 
November 26, 2007).  
15  Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007, iii. 
16 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 152, 
47 (April 26, 2006): S3593–S3597. 
17 Ibid. 
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…as Members come to realize how much we rely on the Guard, I 
believe they will see the reforms in this legislation as not only 
necessary but beneficial to the workings of the entire military. 
There’s no denying that the Guard has earned this enhanced 
stature.18   
Aside from homeland security and civil support considerations, Congress 
has significant electoral incentives in empowering the National Guard.  Since the 
Guard is represented in 3,000 communities across 54 states and territories, 
legislators can tap into built-in political networks supported by influential lobbying 
groups such as the National Guard Association (NGAUS), the Adjutants General 
Association of the US (AGAUS), and National Governor’s Association (NGA).19 
Military historian Charles Gross characterized the Guard as one of the “most 
effective pressure groups in American politics,” with governor appointed 
adjutants general and units in almost every congressional district, who effectively 
cultivated ties with “political parties…governors and congressmen.”20  In addition, 
the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and adjutants general rely on the NGAUS as 
an independent source of information to keep Congress abreast of reserve 
matters, and Gross observes, “Congress prized this independent expertise.”21 
The political connections between Congress and the National Guard are mutually 
beneficial.  Maj Gen Francis Vavala, Delaware’s Adjutant General and President 
of the AGAUS related how these close ties help the Guard,   
Congress probably knows us much better than they know the active 
component…There’s rarely a day that goes by that I’m not talking 
to Senator [Joe] Biden, Senator [Tom] Carper, Congressman 
[Michael] Castle’s office relative to military issues and military 
                                            
18 Committee on Government Reform, “Davis Legislation to Strengthen National Guard: 
Bipartisan Bill Puts Guard Chief on Joint Chiefs of Staff,” news release, April 26, 2006 
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001460/Davisguardbill.pdf 
(accessed November 27, 2007).  
19 Jim Drinkard, “National Guard has formidable lobbying power,” USA Today.com, 
December 17, 2001 http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/12/17/guard-politics.htm, 
(accessed October 24,2007); Richard Green, “NGAUS Legislative Strengths,” National Guard 60, 
7 (July 2006): 10. 
20 Charles J. Gross, “The birth of the Air National Guard:  1943-1946,” National Guard 51, 4 
(April 1997): 30.  
21 Ibid. 
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legislation [in] Congress.  So, I think they understand the guard 
much better than maybe we give them credit for.  And I think they 
also understand that our frustrations have always been with our 
inability to procure the needed resourcing from our service 
component, be it the Army and the Air Force.  They understand that 
they’re really our power base.  We have always gone to them, with 
them uniquely understanding our diversity…And they’ve been the 
ones that have gotten us the necessary resourcing to sustain the 
National Guard.22 
In addition to the political benefits the Empowerment Act offers, this 
legislation could arguably be considered Congress’s attempt to leverage 
interservice rivalry, in this case between Regular and National Guard 
components, to maintain effective control over the military.  Civil-military scholars 
Deborah Avant and Peter Feaver build upon "principal-agent" concepts of “new 
institutionalism” theory to examine the ways civilian “principals” ensure military 
“agents” are efficiently carrying out national security strategy through monitoring, 
reward and punishment structures.  To mitigate the information asymmetries that 
occur in any principal-agent relationship, both Avant and Feaver propose that 
interservice rivalry, which encourages armed services to monitor and report on 
each other, is a source of information Congress can use to evaluate military 
performance.  Avant observed that Congressional “access to military 
advice…furthered a process in which Congress relied on military dissenters for 
information about alternatives to the plans of the administration.”23  Feaver 
described interservice rivalry as a “fire alarm” that could “alert the principal when 
the agent misbehaves.”24  Applying Avant’s and Feaver’s insights to the current 
Empowerment Act, elevating Guard leadership in Pentagon and NORTHCOM 
                                            
22 “A Conversation with Maj. Gen. Francis D. Vavala, National Guard 61, 9 (September 
2007): 29. 
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000003005/vavalamag.pdf 
(accessed November 15, 2007). 
23 Deborah Avant, “Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Contemporary United 
States and United Kingdom,” in Creating Military Power, The Sources of Military Effectiveness, 
ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley.  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 
88.  
24 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 80-82. 
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organizational hierarchies, enables Congress to use the Guard as a form of 
oversight on DoD activities.  Empowerment Act provisions designating a Guard 
general officer as NORTHCOM’s Deputy Commander and classifying the NGB a 
“joint activity” of the DoD further support Feaver’s theory of “fire alarms” since 
both insert National Guard leaders directly into key strategy, budget and 
decision-making channels.  Other provisions that assign the Chief, NGB 
responsibilities for reporting to Congress on the gaps between state and federal 
emergency response capabilities discloses Pentagon priorities for civil support 
requirements. 
Finally, increasing National Guard influence in DoD and NORTHCOM 
organizations has potential implications for the Pentagon's long-standing “Total 
Force” policies.  Total Force philosophy emerged in the post-Vietnam period 
when a culmination of events including President Nixon’s decision to end the 
draft, the military’s transition to an “all volunteer force,” and substantial cuts in 
defense budgets drastically reduced the size of the active armed forces.  
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams 
devised new force structures like the “Roundout Brigades” that relied heavily on 
National Guard and Reserve components to augment diminishing active duty 
populations.  In addition, scholars suggest General Abrams’ decision to transfer 
necessary combat skills into the reserve components was designed to ensure 
U.S. policymakers could not engage in future conflicts without substantial Guard 
and Reserve mobilization.25  Although DoD implemented Total Force programs 
to augment military effort in the midst of declining budgets and personnel, these 
policies failed to fully include National Guard leadership as partners in strategy 
and resourcing decisions.   Rather, the Pentagon preferred to keep the Guard 
                                            
25 Eliot A. Cohen, “Civil-Military Relations: Causes of Concern,” in The Domestic Sources of 
American Foreign Policy, ed. Eugene R. Witkopf and James M. McCormick, (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 197; Jerry Cooper, The Militia and the National 
Guard in America Since Colonial Times: A Research Guide. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1993),  129-130; Janine Davidson, “A Citizen Check on War,” Brookings Institution, November, 
16, 2003, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/1116usmilitary_davidson.aspx (accessed 
October 20, 2007);  Michael Doubler, I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 
1636-2000, 233-243 http://www.arng.army.mil/Publications/guardhistorybook.pdf (accessed 
October 12, 2007). 
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subordinate to its parent services, an uncontroversial decision during the Cold 
War period when it was strictly a “strategic reserve” only to be called upon in the 
later stages of a major regional conflict.  Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon 
England acknowledged this delayed approach often kept the Guard on the 
sidelines of important budget and personnel discussions, 
In the past, the Guard was not always fully resourced.  Limited 
procurement in the 1990’s had an impact on all the Nation’s military 
forces, including the National Guard.  The Guard has not always 
been fully included in decision-making that affected their 
organization and membership.26 
By initiating “empowerment” legislation to give the Guard more influence in 
homeland defense and civil support missions, Congress is, to a certain extent, 
altering the hierarchical relationship between the DoD, National Guard and its 
parent services as originally envisioned by Total Force initiatives.   
C. APPLYING NEW INSTITUTIONALISM THEORY TO EMPOWERMENT 
ACT LEGISLATION 
 “New Institutionalism” theory examines the relationship between 
institutions and their effect on political behavior as well as the process by which 
“institutions originate or change.”27 In his assessment of new institutionalism, 
civil-military relations scholar Thomas Bruneau emphasizes the fundamental role 
that institutions play in shaping national security policy and civilian control of the 
military.  Developing new institutionalism’s key premise that “institutions are all 
about power,” Bruneau observes that institutions are integral to “structuring 
relationships of power,” since the “the conditions under which an institution forms 
will have a strong impact on who determines the rules of the game and how 
                                            
26 Gordon R. England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Statement for the Record to the House 
Armed Services Committee, Hearing on National Guard Enhancement, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 
June 13, 2006. 
27 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms,” Political Studies (1996) XLIV, 937.   
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those rules are implemented.”28  One strand of new institutionalism that has 
particular relevance for the discussion on Empowerment Act legislation is 
“rational choice” which takes a “calculus approach” in its basic assumption that 
political actors will behave strategically to attain individual goals or improve their 
position within an organization.29  In this strategic environment, institutions 
emerge to resolve “collective action dilemmas” and “information asymmetries” 
that develop when actors maneuver for their individual preferences but 
collectively end up with “suboptimal outcomes.”30  To manage the inherent 
uncertainties in anticipating the behavior of other actors, institutions use 
procedural rules, committee systems, and “enforcement devices” to control 
agendas, limit available options and influence actors’ behavior.31  Borrowing from 
principal-agent constructs of “new economics of organization” theory, rational 
choice institutionalists consider monitoring mechanisms essential for gathering 
the information that determines “power relations and political outcomes.”32  
Deborah Avant, Peter Feaver and Amy Zegart offer different perspectives on the 
links between new institutionalism, principal-agent frameworks and policy 
outcomes.  All start from a similar premise that lawmakers are motivated by 
election considerations, the political environment is a series of strategic 
interactions, and institutions are necessary to stabilize this system for efficient 
policy outcomes.  Avant and Feaver study the institutional setting in terms of civil-
military relations, while Zegart analyzes the role and influence of bureaucratic 
agents in shaping national security policies. The following sections briefly 
summarize their theoretical frameworks. 
                                            
28 Thomas C. Bruneau, introduction to Who Guards the Guardians and How:  Democratic 
Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson. (Austin, TX:  University of 
Texas Press, 2006), 7. 
29 Ibid., 939. 
30 Hall and Taylor, 943.  
31 Ibid., 945. 
32 Ibid., 951. 
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1. Avant’s “Principal-Agent” Model 
Deborah Avant builds on new institutionalism’s model of strategic 
interaction with her "principal-agent" variation, which also expects policymakers’ 
decisions to be driven by reelection considerations.  In her construct, Avant 
suggests that “when civilian leaders delegate authority over portions of security 
policy to military organizations…they create new political actors and the problem 
of agency.”33  Based on this delegated authority, Avant observes that military 
leaders can influence the policy agenda and diverge from civilian preferences to 
pursue their own objectives.  To ensure the military aligns its doctrine and 
training to support civilians’ national security priorities, policymakers must design 
oversight mechanisms to oversee its performance and compliance with 
legislators’ priorities.  Avant suggests that interservice rivalry is one example of 
an oversight mechanism, in that it offers Congress valuable insights on “military 
policy” through “dissenters” who provide “information about potential alternatives 
to the plans of the administration or other services.”34        
2. Feaver’s “Agency Theory” 
Peter Feaver develops a similar hypothesis that relations between the 
military and civilian bureaucracy is a "game of strategic interaction" in which 
actors’ choices are shaped by uncertain expectations of how others will react.35  
Like Avant’s principal-agent model, Feaver suggests in his “agency theory” that 
Congress and the executive branch must devise monitoring mechanisms to 
detect whether the military is “working” or “shirking” in fulfilling assigned roles and 
missions.36  Feaver defines “institutional checks” and “fire alarms”37 such as 
                                            
33 Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral 
Wars. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 6. 
34 Avant, “Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness,” 88. 
35 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 58. 
36 Ibid., 75-76. 
 11
interservice rivalries, a separate militia, an independent media and 
Congressional research staffs as devices to oversee and mitigate information 
asymmetries, which tend to favor the military in the advanced technological 
aspects of modern warfare.38   
3. Zegart’s “National Security Agency” Model 
Finally, Amy Zegart outlines her “National Security Agency” model, 
another variant of new institutionalism to explain the difficulties in reforming 
national security agencies.39  She departs from "new institutionalist" theory which 
has "the right idea but the wrong actors" in that it “overemphasizes the role of 
Congress and interest groups” in shaping government agencies while 
"underplaying the role of bureaucrats and Presidents."40  Tailoring her model to 
examine state instruments of foreign policy and national security, she concludes 
that the U.S. divided system of government favors bureaucratic “agents” who 
protect political “turf” by compromise and competition at the expense of 
Presidential efforts to craft effective policy.  Zegart argues that Congress sees 
few electoral advantages in monitoring national security agencies due to the lack 
of interest group participation, a traditional deference to the executive branch on 
foreign policy issues and substantial information gaps from the classified nature 
of the work.  Consequently, Congress exercises negligible oversight, allowing 
bureaucrats to “hobble” agency performance.  In her final assessment, 
presidents must find ways around bureaucrats to develop their preferred policies 
by resorting to “informal strategies to overcome principal-agent problems, such 
                                            
37 Feaver describes institutional checks as a type of third party agent with “veto power over 
the actions of another agent”; Fire alarms on the other hand are actors with “vested interest in the 
actions of the agent…[and] can set off an ‘alarm’ to alert the principal whenever the agent 
misbehaves.” Feaver, 80 – 86. 
38 Ibid., 80-86.  
39 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 9-11. 
40 Ibid., 13. 
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as centralizing decision-making in the White House staff and granting varying 
levels of access to the Office of the President.”41  
D. CONCLUSION 
Zegart’s proposition suggests bureaucratic agents can thwart principals’ 
control by exploiting divisions in the “checks and balance” system of U.S. 
government with minimal Congressional involvement.  However, Avant’s and 
Feaver’s principal-agent concepts offer a useful model to examine the context 
and dynamics of proposed Congressional legislation empowering the National 
Guard.  Applying Avant’s and Feaver’s theoretical assumptions, this thesis will 
argue that Congress, supported by state governors is driving current 
organizational changes in the National Guard based on three main 
considerations: national security concerns to build a robust homeland defense 
and civil support infrastructure utilizing the Guard’s inherent expertise; electoral 
incentives supported by an influential network of domestic political actors with 
vested interests in strengthening the Guard’s political clout; and to employ the 
Guard as a "fire alarm" on DoD and JCS processes to ensure domestic missions 
such as homeland defense, civil support and emergency response are priorities 
in budget and planning cycles.   
Finally, this thesis proposes that Empowerment Act legislation reflects a 
shift in policymakers’ approach to Total Force policies by giving the Guard more 
influence in policy and budget decisions concerning its core domestic missions.  
DoD’s traditional interpretations of Total Force integration built around “unity of 
effort,” “seamlessness,” and “interdependence” among all service components 
has fostered a resistance to change and overemphasized “centralization” as its 
predominant organizational concept.  A series of exogenous events, however, 
initiated the government’s larger efforts to rethink status quo policies, procedures 
and organization.  Recent restructuring of the intelligence community, expanding 
authorities for law enforcement agencies through Foreign Intelligence 
                                            
41 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 48-49.  
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Surveillance and U.S. Patriot Acts, and establishing new bureaucracies like the 
Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 
are manifestations of administration’s strategy to transform national security 
apparatus to be more responsive to evolving security threats.  However, DoD’s 
bureaucratic inertia and tendency towards unilateral decision-making with 
respect to Guard matters has fueled congressional reform efforts.   
Chapter II explores the actors and debates surrounding National Guard 
empowerment legislation, including the recommendations from the independent 
Commission on National Guard and Reserves and the Secretary of Defense’s 
response.  Congress however, was not satisfied with Commission’s and Defense 
Secretary’s solutions, and reintroduced the legislation to be incorporated in this 
years defense authorization bill.  Similarities in both House and Senate versions 
indicate general agreement over the need to enhance the stature and authority of 
National Guard leadership in the Pentagon. 
Chapter III examines new institutionalism theory and principal-agent 
concepts to better understand Congressional incentives for introducing the 
Empowerment Act, and how Congress benefits from stronger National Guard 
influence in DoD. 
Chapter IV proposes that Empowerment legislation has potential impacts 
on DoD’s long standing Total Force policies that have centered on “unity of effort” 
and “integration” between its services and reserve components.  DoD’s 
traditional notions of Total Force are fueling its resistance to redrawing lines of 
authority between the National Guard and its parent services concerning 
domestic support to civilian authorities.   
Chapter V draws some general conclusions regarding the motives and 
incentives behind Empowerment Act legislation.  DoD’s interpretation of Total 
Force integration has kept it from recognizing the Guard’s comparative 
advantages in taking the lead for domestic response missions.  DoD’s 
bureaucratic inertia and its tendency to act unilaterally on Guard issues without 
consulting other key stakeholders has fueled efforts for reform.  Security and 
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defense experts have argued that overly hierarchical, centralized bureaucracies, 
like the DoD’s may have been sufficient for Cold War planning but are at a 
distinct disadvantage in the new asymmetrical threat environment which 
demands speed and adaptation.  Empowerment Act legislation is arguably a 
manifestation of the recognition that status quo organizations and lines of 
authority must be revisited.  But debates surrounding the Empowerment Act also 
illustrate that “all military problems are ultimately political,” as Congress and the 
DoD wrestle with reform initiatives.42   
 
                                            
42 Thomas S. Szayna, et al., The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, 
and Does It Matter? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, DAPRRW008, 2007), 22-23. 
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II. DEBATES SURROUNDING NATIONAL GUARD 
EMPOWERMENT ACT 
A. PROPONENTS SEE LEGISLATION AS NECESSARY FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
Although senior military and civilian policymakers have reached general 
consensus that the Guard has transitioned from a “strategic reserve” to an 
“operational force,”43 considerable debate has surfaced on how to “fundamentally 
change the way the Guard fits into national and homeland defense 
architecture.”44  Congress is addressing perceived inequities in National Guard 
authority with Pentagon and U.S. Northern Command structures, giving the 
Guard a larger voice to coordinate employment, equipment, and training for its 
domestic missions.  Senators Patrick Leahy and Kit Bond also highlighted 
Pentagon failures to include governors and Guard leaders in key force structure 
and budget planning channels, as well as the "last-minute ad-hoc" relations 
between the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Office of Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) during disaster responses as supporting rationale for the 
legislation.45  However, when the House and Senate failed to reach consensus 
on Empowerment Act legislation in the fall of 2006, the bill was passed to the 
                                            
43 See Unedited Transcript before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Roles 
and Missions, March 8 and 9, 2006 http://www.cngr.gov/pdf/0308cngr.pdf and 
http://www.cngr.gov/pdf/0309cngr.pdf (accessed November 26, 2007);  see prepared witness 
statements before the CNGR, Hearing on Roles and Missions, March 8, 2006, of David S. C. 
Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and Lieutenant General 
Raymond T. Odierno, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; see congressional 
transcripts from House Armed Services Committee Hearings on National Guard Enhancement, 
109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 13, 2006  
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001587/HASC-
NG%20ENHANCEMENT%20TRANSCRIPTS.pdf (accessed 4 November 2007); General Richard 
Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, Army,  prepared statement to the House Armed Services Committee, 
109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 13, 2006.  
44 Senator Ike Skelton testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Hearings on 
National Guard Enhancement, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 13, 2006  
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001587/HASC-
NG%20ENHANCEMENT%20TRANSCRIPTS.pdf (accessed November 4,  2007). 
45 Senator Patrick Leahy, Bill Introduction, The National Defense Enhancement and National 
Guard Empowerment Act of 2006, April 26, 2006. 
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Commission on the National Guard and Reserves46 for further study, to conduct 
public testimony and report to Congress with recommendations.  As federal, 
state and military leaders testified during Commission hearings in 2006 and early 
2007, two camps emerged on the efficacy of the legislation to strengthen Guard 
influence in DoD decision making.   
Empowerment Act proponents, led by state governors, the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau (NGB), Adjutants General Association of the United 
States (AGAUS) and National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) 
pointed to declining levels in overall manning, training and equipment levels as 
proof that DoD's "status quo" approach towards Guard readiness issues is 
untenable.  Reform advocates supported the Act’s measures to expand Guard 
authority in the Pentagon and NORTHCOM headquarters as recognition for its 
predominant role in providing homeland defense and civil support.47   Adjutants 
general feared that the continued decline of “dual use” equipment inventories, 
partly the result of outdated budget planning processes, has jeopardized the 
Guard's ability to support emergency response as well as provide critical training 
for overseas combat operations.   
Representative Gene Taylor, a House co-sponsor of empowerment 
legislation, described the Guard’s “home grown” strengths as working members 
of local communities in providing emergency response, in contrast to the regular 
military’s focus on conventional tactics,  
Absolutely no offense to the 82nd Airborne.  They are phenomenal 
soldiers.  But I think you will find that in a disaster recovery mode, 
your National Guardsman who might be a hometown mechanic or 
                                            
46 “The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was established by the Ronald 
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of 2005. Congress chartered the 13-member body to 
conduct a comprehensive, independent assessment of the reserve components of the United 
States.” (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Second Report to Congress, iii). 
47  Major General Raymond F. Rees, Adjutant General for the State of Oregon, combined testimony 
before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, December 14, 2006;  
Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, testimony before the CNGR, 
Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, January 31, 2007. 
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electrician has probably got the skills we need a little better than a 
guy for kicking down doors and shooting people.48   
Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB emphasized the Guard's 
inherent expertise and nation-wide networks with state and local responders 
which makes the Guard ideally suited for civil support and emergency response.  
He believed these qualifications were missing in Pentagon and NORTHCOM 
organizations, suggesting there are, 
…things unique about the National Guard that they have absolutely 
no experience and deep basis of knowledge about, and that my 
input as the chief brings the collective experience and positions of 
the 54 adjutants general and governors…to them in a way that they 
can't get from, frankly, the chief of staff of the Army or the Secretary 
of the Army.49   
Governors reasserted their “Commander in Chief” prerogatives over state 
forces and expressed concerns about the Guard’s ability to meet domestic 
homeland security and disaster response expectations.  Delaware Governor 
Ruth Minner also articulated for many state officials her frustration with being 
overlooked in the DoD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.  
In a prepared statement to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 
Governor Minner recounted Air Force plans to terminate the "only Air National 
Guard flying unit" in the state without notifying her, "If the Air Force would have 
consulted with me, they would have learned the key role the Air National Guard 
plays in all of Delaware's homeland security plans."50  Other state governors and 
adjutants general expressed similar irritation at being left out of key Pentagon 
                                            
48 Representative Gene Taylor, House Reserve Component Caucus, testimony before the 
CNGR Hearings on National Guard Roles and Missions, March 8, 2006, 67-68. 
49 Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, testimony before the 
CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, January 31, 2007. 
50 Governor Ruth Ann Minner, prepared witness statement before the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves, Hearing on National Guard and Reserves Issues, June 15, 2006. 
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decisions impacting Guard force structures and missions.51 Brigadier General 
(ret) Stephen Koper, President of the NGAUS spoke of the enormous political 
capital the Guard has had to expend in reversing DoD decisions where “senior 
Guard leadership has only been involved as an afterthought.”52 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) offered 
additional justification for reassessing the Guard's authority in U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM).  In her testimony53 and a formal report, CSIS analyst 
Christine Wormuth concluded that problems in coordinating federal and military 
response during Hurricane Katrina, especially with command and control issues 
indicated "just how far the U.S. government and military have to go in terms of 
being prepared to provide civil support."54 Improving the military’s support to civil 
authorities required a significant change in DoD’s mentality from an overriding 
emphasis on the “away game…taking the war to the enemy” to “recogniz(ing) 
civil support, particularly in response to a catastrophic event, as a central mission 
for which it must plan, program and budget.”55  CSIS recommended assigning a 
National Guard general as NORTHCOM’s Deputy Commander, to strengthen 
partnerships with state and local agencies that become vital in disaster 
responses.56  Wormuth further suggested that "cultural bias and tensions" 
between active duty military and National Guard units often act as barriers to 
building these civil support networks.57  Adding a Guard general to the 
                                            
51 See Congressional transcript – House Armed Services Committee, June 13, 2006; Major 
General Vavala prepared statement to House Armed Services Committee, June 13, 2006; 
Prepared testimonies to the CNGR, June 15, 2006 for Governor Michael F. Easley and Governor 
George E. Pataki. 
52 Brig Gen (ret) Stephen Koper, President, NGAUS, prepared testimony for House Armed 
Services Committee, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 13, 2006. 
53 Christine Wormuth, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic & International Studies, testimony 
before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, June 15, 2006. 
54 Christine E. Wormuth. The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report. (Washington, DC:  Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, July 2006), 66. 
55 Ibid., 64-69. 
56 Ibid., 84. 
57 Ibid., 82. 
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NORTHCOM chain of command would send a positive signal to state and Guard 
officials the command is committed to making domestic response a priority.  
B. OPPONENTS CONTEND LEGISLATION IS A “STEP BACKWARDS” 
Opponents of the Empowerment Act, in a coalition led by civilian and 
military leaders from OSD, Army, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
NORTHCOM contend that Empowerment Act reforms are unnecessary and 
potentially detrimental to the efficiency of existing organizational processes and 
lines of authority.  DoD leadership affirmed they were actively addressing Guard 
deficiencies through substantial increases in equipment budgets; personnel 
policies to stabilize deployment schedules; rebalancing skills and capabilities 
across active duty and Guard components to ease demands on critical 
specialties; and implementing new force structures to integrate Guard, reserve 
and active duty units.  Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army testified that 
empowerment legislation is simply a "solution looking for a problem that doesn't 
exist."58   
General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff testified before the 
Commission that equipment shortages were not unique to the Guard.  In fact,  
the Army entered the war in Iraq with a $56 billion shortfall, which contributed to 
“cross-leveling” equipment across Guard units to supply deploying forces.59  
However, General Schoomaker asserted the Army has made great strides 
towards reequipping and resetting reserve components by “fenc[ing] more than 
$21 billion for ground systems procurement and $1.9 billion in the aviation 
equipment for fiscal years 2005 through 2011.”60 He also discussed initiatives 
like “Army Force Generation” (ARFORGEN) and “modular brigades” to 
restructure the force and ease operational demands on the Guard as proof that 
                                            
58 Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on 
Proposed Changes to the National Guard, January 31, 2007. 
59 General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on 
Proposed Changes to the National Guard, December 14, 2006. 
60 Ibid. 
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the Army is being responsive to its concerns.  General Richard Cody, Army Vice 
Chief of Staff stressed that the Army is committed to restructuring the force to 
ensure the Guard is well postured for domestic missions under its state role and 
for the global war on terror, but needs time to realize success with its ongoing 
initiatives,  
As we rebalance the combat support and combat service support, 
we said…we need to rebalance the combat service support so it is 
usable for the governors for homeland security and homeland 
defense and consequence management, but also had the requisite 
depth to be able to sustain an all-volunteer force based upon what 
we see as the Global War on Terrorism rotation. It is going to take 
us a while to do what. That is 120,000 spaces in the United States 
Army, active, guard and reserve, that we have to restructure…we 
have already done about 50,000 while we have been fighting this 
Global War on Terrorism.61   
Dr David Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), argued against 
convoluting organizational responsibilities by adding too many participants,  
…this is ultimately about what are going to be the lines of authority 
in the Department…Do you want three military departments to be in 
charge of organizing, training, equipping the military forces of the 
United States?62   
He concluded that elevating the role of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in 
the JCS and DoD as principal advisor on Guard matters would simply confuse 
command channels and undermine the Air Force and Army as managing parent 
services.  Dr Chu strongly advocated maintaining status quo in command 
relationships between the National Guard Bureau and OSD, observing that the  
 
                                            
61 General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, Army, remarks to the CNGR, Hearing on 
National Guard and Reserve Roles and Missions, March 9, 2006, 18. 
62  David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, testimony 
before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, December 13, 2006. 
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United States has found a very successful solution in the six 
decades that we have been a world power.  We think that's still the 
solution for the future.  We think these proposals undercut that 
success if they were enacted.63 
Finally, Dr Chu reminded the Commission that homeland security and disaster 
response are not solely Guard responsibilities, but must be divided among local, 
state and federal agencies.  He recommended building the capabilities of other 
local and federal response assets concurrently so that “early recourse to military 
forces [isn’t] the only option the country possesses.”64  
Senior Air Force leaders cautioned that adopting the legislation would 
weaken DoD’s long standing Total Force policies which have endeavored over 
the last 30 years to create a "seamless Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps." 65  
General Raymond Odierno, former Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, was concerned a perception might develop that the Guard is a separate 
branch, when in fact they are integrated throughout the military, 
…the National Guard and the Reserve component are a part of the 
total force. They are part of the Army. They are part of the Air 
Force. They are part of the Marine Corps. They are part of the 
Navy. And we don't want to move away from that concept.66   
General Odierno repeated the JCS position that the current force structure is 
"properly organized" and adequate to plan for and support service branches and 
their reserve components.67  Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Cody, echoed 
Odierno's concern with preserving Total Force concepts and emphasized the  
 
                                            
63 David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, testimony 
before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, December 13, 2006. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See combined testimonies before the CNGR on Proposed Changes to the National 
Guard, December 13, 2006 for Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force and General T. 
Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 
66 General Raymond Odierno, Testimony before the CNGR on National Guard and Reserve 
Operations and Roles, March 8, 2006, 120. 
67 Ibid. 
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Chief, National Guard Bureau and Director, Army National Guard have full 
access to the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff to discuss policy and 
requirements.68    
Finally, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of NORTHCOM has 
opposed the draft provision assigning a Guard general as NORTHCOM Deputy 
Commander since he didn’t consider the problem to be a lack of Guard 
leadership in NORTHCOM.  Rather, Admiral Keating believed it was a lack of 
"integration" between active duty and Guard communities.  Referring specifically 
to the combined military response during Katrina, Admiral Keating suggested that 
discussions over "who has command and control misses the point."69  He 
concluded that federal and military responses to catastrophic events could be 
significantly improved through integrated planning and training between Guard, 
active duty and Department of Homeland Security personnel.70  The solution 
according to Admiral Keating lies in "unity of effort and results" not necessarily 
unity of command. 
C. COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
REPORTS ITS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After conducting its initial round of public hearings, the Commission 
released its interim report in March 2007.  The findings validated many of the 
legislators’ and governors’ convictions that the National Guard needed additional 
authority and more formal interagency relationships.  Chairman Arnold Punaro 
concluded that "significant reforms are necessary to update and improve the 
status, structure, and activities of the National Guard Bureau and its 
leadership."71   
                                            
68 General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, Army testimony before the House Armed 
Services Committee Hearings on National Guard Enhancement, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 
13, 2006  http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001587/HASC-
NG%20ENHANCEMENT%20TRANSCRIPTS.pdf (accessed 4 November 2007). 
69 Gordon Lubold, "NorthCom boss: Ending crises requires 'unity of effort," Air Force Times, 
November 15, 2006, 1. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007, Transmittal letter. 
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The Commission's specific proposals72 were targeted to bolster Guard 
participation in DoD and NORTHCOM decisions on employment and resources 
and included designating the National Guard Bureau as a "joint activity" of the 
DoD instead of a joint bureau of the Army and Air Force.73  The Commission also 
proposed: assigning the Chief, NGB a principal role in identifying gaps in federal 
and state emergency response capabilities and reporting those shortfalls to 
Congress74; elevating the Chief, NGB position to the rank of full general and 
designating the position as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through 
the Chairman, JCS on non-federal Guard matters75; permanently assigning a 
Guard or Reserve officer as Commander or Deputy Commander of 
NORTHCOM76; and better managing promotion and career opportunities for 
Guard general officers so they may fairly compete for combatant commands and 
senior joint positions.77  The Commission, however, rejected the original 
Empowerment Act’s provision to place the Chief, NGB on the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
explaining that the scope of the Chief’s duties did not merit this move and it was 
more important to preserve Army’s and Air Force’s role as parent components.78 
Finally, the Commission observed that many DoD authorities and policies 
had not been updated since WWII, and did not include NORTHCOM and 
Department of Homeland Security organizations in interagency planning.  These 
                                            
72 The Commission presented 23 recommendations on aspects of the 2006 version of the 
National Guard Empowerment Act as requested by Congress.  I have limited discussion to 
proposals I feel directly relate to enhancing bureaucratic stature and authorities of the Chief, NGB 
and the NGB within NORTHCOM and the Pentagon.  Other Commission recommendations 
pertained to establishing a Governor’s Council; modifying the composition of the Reserve Forces 
Policy Board; increasing the number of reserve personnel in NORTHCOM; and amending legal 
statutes allowing governors to direct federal military forces during a domestic emergency 
response.  
73 Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007, xv. 
74 Ibid., xii. 
75 Ibid., xiv-xv. 
76 Ibid., xvi.  This recommendation differed slightly from Congress’s original proposal 
because it suggests Reserve general officers should be considered for the NORTHCOM position 
as well.  
77 Ibid., xvii-xviii. 
78 Ibid., 75. 
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outdated organizational arrangements contributed to a “lack of clarity and mutual 
understanding of roles, missions, and spheres of authority in the homeland 
mission set.”79  The Commission also considered OSD’s wholesale opposition to 
giving the National Guard a larger role in domestic support missions to be 
shortsighted and problematic, expressed in this exchange between Commission 
Chairman Punaro and JCS Chairman, General Peter Pace,   
When Under-Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
David Chu testified last month, he opposed every provision of the 
legislation and offered support for only one departmental 
request…Secretary Chu did not suggest any alternative 
approaches to deal with any of the issues that the legislation seeks 
to address. And, General Pace, I know firsthand from what the 
commission has heard in testimony, what we’ve learned, not just in 
our several months specific focus on this new statutory tasking we 
got from Congress, but we’ve been in business almost a year, and I 
know that sort of approaching this from the status quo is probably 
not going to pass muster, certainly not in the Congress and 
certainly not from a commission standpoint. 80 
D. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACTS ON COMMISSION’S FINDINGS 
After releasing its Second Report to Congress in March 2007, the 
Commission presented its recommendations to the newly appointed Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates for review and action.  In a turnaround from previous 
OSD and JCS opposition, Secretary Gates convened a DoD working group to 
study the feasibility of adopting the recommendations.  He subsequently 
accepted a majority of the Commission's proposals, enacting either through 
executive order or policy change.81  As suggested in the Commission’s report, 
Gates assumed responsibility to oversee the Guard’s charter; designate the 
                                            
79 Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007, viii. 
80 Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman, CNGR, remarks during Commission’s Hearings on Proposed 
Changes to the National Guard and Reserves, January 31, 2007. 
81 Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., 
"Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserves," May 10, 2007 
http://www.militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/051007guard_reserve_memo.pdf (accessed 
May 18, 2007). 
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Chief, NGB a principal advisor through the Chairman, JCS; incorporate civil 
support requirements in service budgets; and develop consequence 
management plans for a coordinated Guard and active duty military response to 
domestic incidents. 
However, Secretary Gates preempted some of the Commission’s larger 
incursions into JCS authority by devising alternatives to protect parent service 
autonomy.  Specifically, Gates modified the Commission’s proposal to make the 
National Guard a joint activity within the DoD by changing eligibility criteria 
allowing joint credit and awards for Guard personnel who serve on the 
headquarters staff of the National Guard Bureau.  This mirrored General Pace’s 
interpretation of the provision when asked by Commission member E. Gordon 
Stump about making the Bureau a “joint activity,”  
The real impetus, I believe, is for those officers who serve in those 
jobs…to get the joint credit that allows them to compete for the jobs 
that we want them to compete for...what we should do with the 
National Guard Bureau is take a look at the structure in the Guard 
Bureau and…make sure that they get the joint credit they 
deserve…so that when he competes to be the guy to go to 
NORTHCOM to head up as a colonel…that he can compete for 
those jobs. That’s what I think the impetus is and I embrace making 
sure that those who do joint work get joint credit.82 
Since joint experience is an essential prerequisite for senior level promotions and 
command, Gates’ policy was an effort to make Guard and Reserve officers more 
competitive for these opportunities.  Finally, instead of permanently assigning a 
Guard general officer as NORTHCOM Commander or Deputy Commander, 
Gates pledged to improve processes to 
…consider qualified National Guard and reserve officers for the 
most senior command and leadership positions within the 
Department, not only at U.S. Northern Command, but all joint and 
                                            
82 General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony before the CNGR, 
Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, January 31, 2007. 
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service senior leadership positions, consistent with their education, 
training and civilian and military experience.83  
E. LEGISLATORS PRESS AHEAD WITH NATIONAL GUARD 
EMPOWERMENT ACT OF 2007 
Despite Secretary Gates' positive response to the Commission’s findings, 
Senators Leahy and Kit Bond felt the recommendations did not adequately 
address the true nature of Guard organizational deficiencies.  The Senators 
reintroduced their original bill as the “National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007” 
to be incorporated in the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, 
announcing “[we] remain committed to passing every facet of the Guard 
Empowerment Act.  The measures the commission did not support remain a vital 
part of our legislation.”84  The House resubmitted their version of the legislation 
for review and markup as well.  House and Senate approved versions emerged 
from the legislative process with differences that are currently being reconciled in 
conference committee.  But what is worth noting in both House and Senate 
drafts, are the significant similarities in four main policy areas: formalizing roles 
and authorities of the Chief, NGB; modifying the status and purpose of the NGB 
for coordinating Guard utilization in domestic missions; expanding the role of the 
Secretary of Defense in overseeing the NGB and military support to civilian 
authorities; and reserving the NORTHCOM Deputy Commander position for a 
qualified Guard general officer.  The convergences indicate a broad consensus in 
Congress that reforming the Guard’s scope of responsibilities and establishing 
more formal access to the Secretary of Defense independent of Army and Air 
Force leadership is needed.  The following sections detail the parallels in both 
versions of the draft legislation. 
                                            
83 SECDEF Memo "Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves," May 10, 2007. 
84 U.S. Senate National Guard Caucus, “Senate Guard Caucus Leaders: Commission’s 
Report Falls Short On Prescriptions To Improve Guard’s Intra-Pentagon Role,” news release, 
March 1, 2007 
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000002315/caucusrelease030107.d
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1. Role of Chief, National Guard Bureau 
Both versions of the National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007 reflect 
legislators’ intentions to increase the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s 
stature and responsibility in the Pentagon, by upgrading the position to full 
general and expanding its role as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense 
through the Chairman of the JCS.  Senator Bond explained his rationale for 
promoting the position, 
I’ve been around the military long enough to know that if you’re in a 
room with a guy withy more stars on his shoulder, he’s the one that 
does the talking, and if you’re lucky, you get to listen, not talk.85  
Enhancing the Chief, NGB’s position also provides a formal channel for 
state governors to articulate civil support needs to the Pentagon through their 
adjutants general to the Chief. 
The Senate version adds a requirement that the Chief, NGB must report to 
Congress annually on states’ requirements for military civil support and indicate 
whether funding has been programmed into next year’s budget for validated state 
needs.  Testimony during Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 
revealed DoD’s priority to be funding and equipping the Guard for its Title 10 role, 
but considered Guard’s Title 32 role as a “lesser included set of capabilities.”86  
Since it was a secondary consideration for DoD decisionmakers and because the 
Guard had no avenues outside Army and Air Force budget channels, General 
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Blum testified the Guard had limited success with competing these requirements 
in programming and budget channels.  This annual report illustrates the principal-
agent concept of a “monitoring” device enabling Congress to assess DoD’s 
effectiveness in resourcing civil support needs.     
2. Purpose of National Guard Bureau 
In addition to strengthening the Chief, NGB’s clout in the Pentagon, House 
and Senate versions of the National Guard Empowerment Act for 2007 intend to 
increase the stature of the National Guard Bureau (NGB).  By altering its charter 
to become a “joint activity” of the DoD, versus a joint bureau of the Army and Air 
Force, Congress is giving the Guard more independence in managing aspects of 
military assistance to civil authorities.  Although empowerment legislation clarified 
that NGB remains the channel of communication between the Air Force, Army 
and states, under House and Senate draft proposals, it will serve as the central 
“hub” for coordinating Guard personnel and resources for domestic missions 
when requested.  Expanding the role of the NGB to be the central coordinator for 
Guard support is partly a response to lessons from the Hurricane Katrina 
response.  The Senate’s special report on Katrina highlighted significant 
problems in states’ efforts to request disaster support through the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) process.  The report had criticized 
the EMAC system as too slow and bureaucratic to efficiently process large 
military deployments into the disaster area.87  At the request of Mississippi and 
Louisiana state officials, the NGB intervened and coordinated requests for Guard 
support directly from states’ adjutants general.88  The Commission supported 
formalizing this arrangement to anticipate what will likely happen in future 
disasters and to streamline the process for requesting Guard support.89  The 
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Senate version of the National Guard Empowerment Act further broadens the 
NGB’s mandate for coordinating Guard mobilization to include overseas 
contingencies and “military operations other than war,”90 which suggests 
legislator intent to give the National Guard more authority in managing its assets, 
beyond Army and Air Force channels. 
3. U.S. Northern Command 
Both Senate and House drafts of the National Guard Empowerment Act 
stipulate that the Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM position will be filled by a 
qualified National Guard general.  Since “U.S. Northern Command is the joint 
command in charge of Title 10 homeland defense and civil support activities”, 
this initiative is intended to add Guard influence in coordinating Title 32 aspects 
of NORTHCOM civil support plans and operations.91  The Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves also noted that the “commander of U.S. Northern 
Command does not sufficiently advocate for the full range of civil support 
requirements affecting the National Guard and Reserves.”92  Critics contend that 
NORTHCOM has been too focused on defending against terrorist threats to the 
homeland.  Consequently, it has been more hesitant about civil support missions, 
operating under the mindset that as a supporting agency it must wait for official 
requests by the lead federal agency, and only after local and state forces had 
been overwhelmed.93  Government statements on the Hurricane Katrina 
response suggest that the slow military response was due in part to DoD’s 
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delayed approach to disaster aid support.94  This provision attempts to balance 
NORTHCOM’s focus on its Title 10 homeland defense missions by adding Guard 
leadership in the chain of command to address civil support operations.   
4. Expanded Role of Secretary of Defense 
House and Senate versions of the National Guard Empowerment Act  
assign overarching responsibility to the Secretary of Defense to identify, budget, 
delegate and monitor “military unique” plans and capabilities for military support 
to civil authorities.95  The Secretary must also report annually to Congress after 
consulting with NORTHCOM and the Chief, NGB on plans for coordinated Guard 
and active duty military response to various domestic disasters and terrorist 
events.  Applying principal-agent logic, these sections are designed to evaluate 
DoD activities with respect to planning and funding civil support response.  
Testimony by senior DoD and DHS representatives to the Commission on the 
National Guard and Reserves revealed that no single federal agency had 
responsibility to ensure military requirements for civil support were identified and 
submitted for funding.   
Senate and House sponsors also concur on assigning the Defense 
Secretary additional responsibility for managing the NGB charter and exercising 
quality control on Guard officers nominated for the Chief, NGB position.  Under 
proposed arrangements in both drafts, the Secretary of Defense will periodically 
review and approve the Bureau’s charter, incorporating inputs from the Army and 
Air Force Chiefs, and the Chairman, JCS.  The Commission noted that several 
new and existing responsibilities had not been added to the Guard’s charter.  
Since the bulk of the new duties were related to the Guard’s non-federal tasks, 
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the Commission noted it would be more appropriate for the Secretary of Defense 
rather than service Secretaries to supervise the review and update process.96  
Properly documenting the full range of NGB’s roles and missions might 
strengthen any future initiatives by Congress to seat the Chief, NGB on the JCS.   
Last, Empowerment Act proponents in the House and Senate task the 
Secretary of Defense to refine nomination procedures ensuring candidates for 
the position of Chief, NGB, have substantial joint and operational experience, 
appropriate levels of military education, and extensive knowledge of homeland 
defense.  Defense policy specialist Lawrence Kapp suggested this quality control 
provision is designed to reverse long-standing perceptions that Guard generals 
are less qualified or capable to command, by aligning “the recommendation 
process for NGB Chief into greater harmony with the process used for 
recommending officers for other O-9 and O-10 positions.” 97  This section could 
be seen as Congress’s attempt to level the playing field by ensuring Guard 
officers have more opportunities and are equitably considered for positions of 
responsibility.   
F.  CONCLUSION  
National Guard reform advocates maintain that the Guard's transformation 
from a Cold War "strategic reserve" to a post-9/11 “operational force" 
necessitates a similar transformation in DoD hierarchies.98  Traditional DoD 
command relationships, requirements and appropriations channels have not kept 
pace with the Guard’s expanded challenges in supporting its dual missions of 
overseas operations and civil support.    
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Senior leaders in the DoD and Pentagon argue that current organizational 
structures are sufficient, and legislation giving more authority to the National 
Guard comes at the expense of efficient operations and full integration with the 
Army and Air Force.  DoD leadership further contends that the most effective way 
to manage current strains on the National Guard is to focus on personnel 
management policies, sustained funding levels, and rebalance forces while 
preserving existing lines of authority.  
 The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves concluded that its 
recommendations for organizational changes in the Guard are essential for 
addressing the "new threat environment."99  Their proposals incorporate two new 
national security bureaucracies, the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. 
Northern Command, into DoD interagency planning processes; strengthen the 
ties between state governors and the DoD through the Chief, National Guard 
Bureau; and advise Congress on shortfalls between state and federal emergency 
response capabilities.     
The overarching similarities in both House and Senate approved versions 
of empowerment legislation suggest a concerted effort to give the National Guard 
more authority and stature in policy and budget decisions with respect to military 
assistance to civilian authorities, emergency response and civil support.  Both 
versions formalize the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s role in coordinating 
use of personnel and resources between states and other federal agencies, and 
advising the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, JCS on Guard issues.  
Congress has strengthened its oversight capacity by levying reporting 
requirements on the Chief, NGB and Secretary of Defense on DoD efforts to 
identify, train and budget for military support to civil authorities.  Finally, Congress 
has placed the Secretary of Defense squarely in charge of overseeing the 
National Guard charter, and screening candidates to serve as the Chief, NGB. 
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III. APPLYING NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND PRINCIPAL-
AGENT CONCEPTS 
A. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE ASSUMPTIONS 
Political action involves the management of uncertainty.100 
The rational choice school of new institutionalism operates on three basic 
assumptions concerning the way institutions affect political behavior.  First, 
legislators’ policy choices are primarily driven by a “fixed set of preferences,” 
generally to be reelected to office.101  Second, the political environment is a 
“series of collective action dilemmas” in which actors, vying for their individual 
preferences, reach outcomes that are “collectively suboptimal.”102  Last, due to 
pervasive uncertainty of anticipating what other actors will do, institutions are 
necessary to manage competition through procedural rules, committee systems, 
and “enforcement mechanisms,” making political outcomes more efficient and 
predictable.103  Applying these assumptions to current debates over the National 
Guard Empowerment Act, Congress can be seen to be motivated to reform the 
Guard because it offers important political and electoral benefits.  Maintaining 
effective Guard capabilities for civil support and emergency management is 
advantageous for politicians who benefit by providing important public services to 
their constituents and capitalizing on an extensive political network of governors, 
adjutants general and Guard units.  
In addition to assumptions concerning the role of institutions in shaping 
political outcomes, rational choice theorists examine the methods by which 
politicians’ control government bureaucracies.  The extent to which politicians are 
perceived as successful in providing public goods and services to their 
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constituents, depends largely on how well bureaucrats work under delegated 
authority.  Rational choice theorists incorporate principal-agent concepts like 
monitoring devices and “enforcement mechanisms” to explain politicians’ 
influence on agents’ behavior and the need for information to verify bureaucrats 
are carrying out legislators’ priorities.  In this perspective, the Empowerment Act 
enables Congressional oversight of the DoD by utilizing the Guard as a 
monitoring device for evaluating how well DoD  prioritizes and funds civil support 
requirements. 
B. AVANT’S INSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Civil-military relations scholar Deborah Avant, using new institutionalism 
and principal-agent concepts to examine civilian influence on military doctrine, 
constructs “a model to explain when military organizations will respond 
appropriately to a state's security goals and when they will not."104  Categorizing 
military and civilian leaders as “strategic actors” pursuing specific, possibly 
divergent organizational preferences, she articulates a new institutionalist 
understanding that "political incentives change…notions of the national interest, 
condition its implementation through special interest group politics, and manage 
the ground rules for bureaucratic politics."105 Avant proposes that civilians can 
effectively shape military preferences through incentive structures, such as 
promotion systems.  However, interservice rivalry stemming from competition for 
resources and missions can also be a useful dynamic for civilian control of the 
military.  Avant describes the collateral benefits that resulted after Congress 
changed the rules for budget processes in the 1920s, as each service found itself 
competing with other branches for budgets and missions,  
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…competition over strategy…provided civilians with a range of 
doctrines appropriate to meet a variety of pressing security 
concerns (as well as the parochial pork-barrel concerns of 
Congress).106   
Interservice competition proved useful during the Cold War era as well when 
Army and Air Force planners maneuvered to devise strategies and doctrine 
against the Soviet Union, providing “civilians a range of options for meeting this 
threat.”107 Avant argues that military competition facilitated congressional 
oversight by providing tangible proof the services had merged their preferences 
with civilians’ foreign policy goals.    
Finally, Avant suggests politicians’ reform efforts are motivated more by 
individual self interests than concerns about a particular security threat,   
A domestic political actor is likely to promote institutional change in 
response to a changing position in the international system if the 
shift will augment that actor’s domestic political advantage.108 
C. FEAVER’S AGENCY THEORY 
Peter Feaver offers a perspective on civil-military interaction through his 
“agency theory”, based on the idea that civilians delegate authority to the military 
to provide national security, but do not “abdicate control.”109  While military and 
civilian leaders generally agree on the necessity to provide national security, they 
may differ on the means and strategy to produce it.  He reasons that, because it 
is cost prohibitive for civilians to monitor every military activity, lawmakers use 
incentives and monitoring mechanisms to shape actors’ preferences and detect 
when the military is straying from the civilian agenda.  Like Avant, Feaver  
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proposes that interservice rivalry can be an effective “fire alarm” alerting civilian 
officials to various issues about other branches of service or provide inside 
information about activities in the DoD.  
D. APPLYING NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
CONCEPTS TO CONTEMPORARY SETTING 
Recent findings from a 2007 RAND study on the state of civil-military 
relations in the United States offer a contemporary application of Avant’s and 
Feaver’s institutional dynamics and principal-agent frameworks.  Analyzing the 
link between civil-military relations and military effectiveness, the RAND study 
concluded that in general terms, military and civilian leaders were united in their 
perception that transnational terrorism is the most important threat to national 
security.110  However, despite consensus on the nature of the threat, the RAND 
study predicted conflicts would likely surface over means and strategy due to 
“attitudinal differences” relating to “organizational affiliations which influence 
military’s and civilians’ views regarding the national interest and the role of the 
armed forces in contributing to national security.”111  In a bureaucracy as 
massive and complex as the DoD, senior civilians are primarily responsible for 
overarching strategy development, but in the interest of organizational efficiency, 
must delegate authority over detailed operational and tactical plans to military 
agents.112  The military subsequently develops expertise in the specialized, 
technological aspects of waging modern warfare, and thus has opportunities to 
influence policy outcomes by manipulating the agenda and flow of information to 
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principal-agent assumptions in observing that actors’ “salience, preferences and 
political capabilities” determine how closely civilian principals must monitor 
military’s decisions and performance.113   
Since decisions are the outcomes of “conflict and bargaining” between 
civilian and military, organizational structure and monitoring are critical in 
minimizing “policy drift” and “bureaucratic discretion” among agents to implement 
policy as they deem appropriate.114  Structured decision-making processes also 
determine agenda and participants in key policy and budget issues, and are 
important channels in which to advocate priorities.  General Blum, Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau commented on the importance of being included in 
formal, bureaucratic arrangements during testimony to the Commission on 
National Guard and Reserves, when he suggested the root of Guard readiness 
and equipment problems stemmed partly from “informal, ad hoc” relations 
between the Guard Bureau and DoD organizations.  Under such unofficial 
arrangements, he noted that the Guard may or may not be invited to participate 
on decisions directly impacting its force structure, budgets and missions,   
It doesn't mean that we're going to be right all of the time and we're 
going to be listened to any of the time, but at least we get heard 
and at least we have our position added to the thought process, to 
the decision-making process.  And that's, I think all we're asking for, 
and I have faith and confidence in the people that run the 
Department of Defense and who serve on the Joint Chiefs, and 
particularly the chairman and vice chairman, that if they get good 
inputs, total, full disclosure, they will make the right 
recommendations.115 
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E. EXPLAINING CONGRESSIONAL INTERESTS IN PURSUING 
EMPOWERMENT ACT LEGISLATION 
Using rational choice institutionalism and principal-agent concepts 
constructed by Feaver and Avant, Congress is driving Empowerment Act 
legislation to improve the Guard’s institutional position in the Pentagon based on 
electoral considerations and as a source of information on DoD performance.  
The following sections describe the policy and electoral motives behind 
strengthening the Guard’s “bureaucratic muscle”, to include utilizing the Guard as 
a monitoring device on DoD activities.  
1. Policy Considerations 
Testimony and public statements on empowerment legislation suggest 
Congress is pursuing a legislative remedy due to legitimate concerns over 
homeland security and improving civil support capabilities.  Legislators’ interest in 
the health and future of the reserve components predates current Empowerment 
Act legislation, when Congress established the Commission on National Guard 
and Reserves in 2005 with a broad mandate to  
…identify and recommend changes in law and policy to ensure the 
National Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, 
compensated and supported to best meet the national security 
requirements of our nation now and in the future.116   
The Commission was chartered principally to study the implications of 
transitioning the Guard from a strategic reserve to an operational force and make 
recommendations on organization, force structure, roles and benefits.117  The 
Commission was also tasked to determine an effective balance in skills and 
capabilities supporting the Guard’s dual missions of overseas operations and as 
a military responder for state and local governments. 
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As the Commission began its series of initial public hearings on Guard and 
Reserve issues, Congress pressed ahead with more specific solutions, outlined 
in the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 
2006.  Citing concerns the National Guard had not been an equal partner in the 
2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) process, decisions 
regarding cuts in Guard manning outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, and the disorganized state and federal response during Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, Congress initiated empowerment legislation to strengthen the 
Guard’s bureaucratic position within the DoD.  Senator Bond, a co-sponsor of the 
legislation observed, “In terms of Guard’s strategic role in the Active 
military…Guard is often treated as a lesser partner.”118  The Empowerment Act 
was also intended to ensure state governors, as key stakeholders, are consulted 
in future decisions regarding force structure and missions.     
2. Electoral Considerations 
Civil-military relations scholars observe that Congress benefits 
considerably from its relationship with the National Guard, a valued organization 
in state and local communities, not only in terms of the emergency response 
resources it possesses, but the economic benefits the Guard brings through jobs 
and federal revenues.  Politicians’ efforts to strengthen and protect Guard 
missions and force structure often translate into votes.  Lt Col David Fautua 
describes the strong ties between local communities and Guard units, which are 
generally the first military responders people see in a disaster or emergency, “it is 
the Army National Guard which is tangibly serving the people’s needs, led by 
local leaders, commanded by state governors.”119 These civic connections offer 
an attractive draw for politicians to be seen as Guard advocates. 
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Steven Duncan, former Undersecretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
under President George H. W. Bush describes how legislators’ policy choices are 
influenced by the economic benefits the Guard brings to local communities.  He 
recounts with a fair degree of cynicism the Bush administration’s struggles to 
draw down the military after the costly defense buildup during President 
Reagan’s tenure.  Governors and legislators who were vocal about the need to 
cut the defense budget to fund domestic programs, were also united against the 
executive to protest reductions in Guard forces,  
…the Boston Globe gave, perhaps, the most candid assessment of 
the political reality: ‘Congressmen, for their part, love the reserves, 
which represent home district jobs worth about $6,000 per slot each 
year – in other words, votes.’ 120  
Peter Feaver links electoral imperatives to perceived threat levels, 
suggesting that national security becomes more important to politicians in a 
heightened threat environment, “when threat is high, there is a large electoral 
payoff for devoting attention to defense policy.”121  Although Feaver was referring 
primarily to external threats associated with the Cold War, his rationale is equally 
applicable to current domestic threats as featured in various national strategy 
documents released since 9/11.122  Homeland security and emergency response 
have become important considerations amidst fears of future terrorist attacks on 
the U.S.  In addition, the confused and disjointed response to Hurricane Katrina 
revealed significant gaps in state, federal and military disaster response 
protocols.  In fulfilling the expectations of their constituencies, lawmakers stand 
to gain by “doing something” to address homeland threats and strengthen 
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response capabilities for future natural or manmade disasters. 123  In addition, 
Congress has been energized to take action through Empowerment Act 
legislation on key issues impacting the Guard, such as uncertainties concerning 
Air Force plans to replace Guard missions terminated in the BRAC process, 
DoD’s recommended cuts in Guard personnel outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, and chronic shortages in Guard equipment required for 
domestic support.   
3. Fostering Interservice Tension as a “Fire Alarm” Mechanism 
Drawing upon Avant and Feaver’s observations regarding interservice 
rivalry as a useful source of information, Congress arguably has an interest in 
encouraging competition between National Guard and regular military as a 
means to facilitate oversight on DoD agendas and priorities.  Feaver argues that 
service rivalry encourages productive military “working” because it fosters 
adaptation and innovation as services compete with each other for missions, 
particularly in new threat environments.124  Competition between the services 
prevents “undue reliance on one narrow military approach to national 
security.”125  Finally, Feaver observes that a unified military is more effective at 
pursuing its organizational preferences and “resisting civilian control.”126  Zegart 
concurs that Congress prefers a divided military,   
Division within the military ranks was good for Congress.  Not only 
did it reinforce civilian control of the military, but it enabled 
individual members to exercise substantial influence over military 
policies and weapons programs.127 
                                            
123 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. 
(Springer Science+Business Media, LLC/Copernicus Books, 2006), 33. 
124 Feaver, 296. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Zegart, 155. 
 42
Historian Charles Cooper suggests that rivalry in the military is nothing 
new, and in fact has long been a part of bureaucratic relations between regular 
and reserve components, as each competed for resources and relevance in 
changing strategic environments, 
…how the tasks of national defense are to be divided between the 
regulars and the volunteers has become an enduring question in 
American military history, each side contending for a monopoly 
over the divisions of military labor.  In the modern era, tensions 
between the two traditions have normally been the most intense 
during periods of military demobilization when each side argues for 
the sacrifice of the other in order to maintain military 
effectiveness.128  
Congress can capitalize on institutional tensions between Guard and 
regular military and employ the Guard as a watchdog on Pentagon and 
NORTHCOM activities.  Empowerment Act provisions that give more autonomy 
to Guard leaders in managing civil support and disaster response, place the 
Guard’s charter under the purview of the Secretary of Defense and designate the 
National Guard Bureau as the focal point for coordinating requests for Guard 
support foster tension over authority and control of resources.  Making the Chief, 
NGB responsible for reporting to Congress the gaps between state and federal 
response capabilities and placing a Guard general in the NORTHCOM chain of 
command also add monitoring elements to organizational relationships between 
the Guard, Air Force, Army, and DoD which benefit Congress as a source of 
information on DoD activities. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Avant and Feaver extend rational choice institutionalism and principal-
agent concepts to civilian control of the military, described as an interactive 
environment of “conflict and bargaining.”129  In this context, testimony and 
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debates over National Guard Empowerment Act reveal Congress’s legitimate 
policy concerns for the future viability of the National Guard with respect to its 
dual missions and contributions to national security.  But Congress also has 
significant incentives for providing important public services such as homeland 
security and disaster response to its electorate.  Legislation strengthening the 
Guard’s bureaucratic position in the competition for DoD resources, ultimately 
benefits constituents, which could translate into votes.  Finally, Empowerment 
Act provisions that direct reporting requirements, alter existing divisions of labor 
and mandate an increased role for the National Guard Bureau in coordinating 
Guard assets, transform the Guard into a “fire alarm,” taking advantage of its 
historical tensions with the regular military to ensure the DoD is prioritizing and 
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IV. REVISITING TOTAL FORCE PRINCIPLES TO ADDRESS NEW 
STRATEGIC CHALLENGES 
A. RETHINKING TOTAL FORCE CONCEPTS 
Congressional initiatives to reform National Guard structure and policies 
typically correspond to profound changes in the national security environment or 
in response to national crises.  The National Guard Empowerment Act is no 
exception, introduced in the midst of fundamental shifts in the world order 
triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of transnational terrorism, a 
revolution in information technology, and a long war on terror.  The current 
administration, in an effort to transform national security organizations for diverse 
new threats, has reexamined existing divisions of labor, interagency 
relationships, and lines of authority with a goal to improving integration and 
information sharing across all “elements of national power.”130  The 
Empowerment Act, as one aspect of this national effort for organizational reform, 
attempts to restructure the Guard’s lines of authorities and responsibilities for 
homeland defense and civil support.  Reforms outlined in empowerment 
legislation also have larger implications for DoD‘s Total Force policies which 
have been its guiding principles in budgets, training and equipping regular and 
reserve components.   
The National Guard’s role in the U.S. military since Vietnam has largely 
been shaped by DoD's thirty-year policy of “Total Force.”  Confronted with 
declining defense budgets and a shrinking active duty force in the aftermath of 
Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird first articulated "Total Force" in 1973 
to maintain a strong deterrence posture against the Soviet Union and honor the 
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U.S.’s commitment to NATO for a forward deployed presence in Europe.131  
Secretary Laird’s Total Force vision was “to create a genuine ready reserve, with 
Guard and Reserve units properly trained and equipped so that they could be 
mobilized and deployed immediately…and integrated directly into active Army 
combat operations.”132  These policies have evolved since 1973 to become a 
core principle in DoD strategic and operational planning, which leverages less 
expensive Reserve components to augment more costly active duty forces in 
fulfilling national security objectives.  
Total Force has also been linked with the “Abrams Doctrine,” after the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams who developed “Roundout 
Brigades” using Guard units to augment active duty forces and rebalanced 
necessary combat skills and support functions into the reserve components.  
These force structure changes were initiated out of necessity to maintain a viable 
Army, as active duty manning and budget levels declined precipitously with the 
end of the draft and the military’s transition to a volunteer force.  Historians and 
civil-military relations experts are also in general agreement that the Abrams 
Doctrine ensured the next major conflict could not be fought without a large 
mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves.  Senior military leaders 
considered President Johnson’s reluctance to mobilize the Guard during Vietnam 
as a strategic failure and historian Michael Doubler suggests Abrams’ 
restructuring was intentionally designed to,  
…wean the Army from its reliance on draftees and to once again 
create a dependency on the National Guard as its primary combat 
reserve.  However, more than thirty years of the draft and the 
trauma of the Vietnam War made the reconciliation slow and only 
partially successful.  Because of the bitter Vietnam experience, 
General Abrams was determined to structure the active Army so it 
could never again go to war without the full support of the American 
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people.  The Roundout program made ARNG combat brigades the 
vital link between the American people and the Army. 133  
Analyst Janine Davidson argues in her commentary “A Citizen’s Check on 
War,” that Total Force is equally relevant today, by adding important elements of 
transparency and accountability in the ongoing debates over Guard roles and 
missions.  Friction over Guard deployments are positive signs that Total Force is 
succeeding as a "check and balance" on U.S. foreign policy,  
In today's Total Force structure, repeated activations of reserves 
are supposed to take a toll.  The budding debate over the structure 
and use of our military is a healthy reflection that the system is 
working.  Unfortunately, Rumsfeld's response - to restructure the 
force for more efficient, less noticeable deployments - risks 
ensuring that such democratic debates will simply fade away.134     
However, Stephen Duncan proposes that DoD must reexamine Total 
Force concepts to better utilize the comparative advantages of each component 
in supporting an evolving national security strategy.  He suggests the distinction 
between overseas operations and domestic missions are no longer useful, 
“...lines between ‘foreign’ and domestic’ and ‘war’ and ‘crime,’ the line between 
‘military assignments’ and ‘civilian functions’ is no longer as bright as it was 
before 9/11.”135  Duncan contends that DoD planners must critically assess 
existing divisions of labor to improve military efficiency,  
A primary question which must now be answered is what 
conventional and homeland security missions can, and should be 
assigned to Active force units and personnel, and to Reservists, 
including the National Guard?  What Active/Reserve force mix is 
required to ensure that the War on Terror is successfully 
prosecuted, that our other strategic challenges are successfully 
met, that all necessary missions - whether they are to be performed 
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overseas or at home - are performed effectively?  What military 
skills, experience, and resources are critical to homeland security 
and to what units and personnel should they be taught and 
given?136 
B. OSD AND CJCS: TOTAL FORCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR UNITY OF 
COMMAND AND EFFORT 
Senior DoD civilian and military leaders’ testimonies to the Commission on 
the National Guard and Reserves consistently supported Total Force principles 
as critical to integrating doctrine, missions, and resources between Reserve 
components and regular military.  Military leaders warned that giving the National 
Guard autonomy as implied in empowerment legislation will confuse lines of 
authority and foster a perception that the Guard is a separate service.  Air Force 
Secretary Wynne cautioned against treating the Guard as an independent 
branch,  
The key to success is our integration and interdependence, and we 
need to be careful of the unintended consequences of stovepiping. 
Anything that would essentially create independence ultimately 
creates independent thought, ultimately creates independent 
structure, ultimately creates independent solutions problems. Our 
team can’t afford to be divided. Unity of effort depends upon our 
current organizational structure. Islands ultimately will drift towards 
different alliances, weapons systems requirements, and 
equipment.137 
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Mike Moseley suggested that 
empowerment legislation could lead to a duplication of effort in acquisition and 
procurement processes and interoperability problems if the Guard is allowed to 
purchase its own equipment for civil support missions.  General Moseley was 
also concerned the Air National Guard (ANG) could be at a distinct disadvantage 
as the smaller component in any organizational restructuring that gave the 
National Guard Bureau more authority, 
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…look at the percentages of mass…If you combined that into a 
separate service, what would that do to the Air Guard as a culture?  
What would it do to the Air Guard’s ability to be part of the Air Force 
and not an air arm to something [else]?138 
C. ARE THERE LIMITS TO FULL INTEGRATION? 
The National Guard is an indispensable partner in matching national 
security strategy means to ends as Total Force evolves to meet a diverse set of 
national security challenges.  Congress, supported by state governors is 
renegotiating the bureaucratic boundaries of Guard’s traditional roles, missions 
and authorities to expand its scope of decision-making.  Empowerment Act 
advocates suggest the post-9/11 environment revealed limitations in traditional 
applications of Total Force policies.  A 2004 GAO Report concluded that the 
Army's "Cold War" interpretation of Total Force left it unprepared for new 
demands of an open-ended, indefinite war on terror, observing “the Army could 
not efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans, because the 
plans contained certain outdated assumptions."139  A 2006 GAO Report offered a 
similar assessment of the Army’s legacy approach towards its reserve 
components, 
Growing equipment and personnel shortages in nondeployed units 
are symptoms of an outdated model for balancing reserve unit 
capabilities, costs, and risks. While DoD’s strategies for supporting 
Army reserve component units during the Cold War may have been 
appropriate to that era, significant changes in the national security 
environment have led to greater use of the Army reserve 
components on an ongoing basis and spurred the need for a 
comprehensive reassessment of reserve component equipping, 
personnel, and training policies. 140 
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Although a strong proponent of Total Force principles, General Blum 
raised concerns about Army and Air Force policies that indirectly contributed to 
the Guard's eroding readiness levels.  Since the parent services consider Title 32 
missions a secondary priority, Blum testified the Guard has no independent 
avenue to submit equipment and training requirements for its civil support 
functions. Consequently, General Blum has had to pursue supplemental funding 
outside official Army and Air Force channels, which was not "appreciated by 
anybody.”141  Other adjutants general testified that while Total Force policies 
have worked well in supporting the Guard’s Title 10 federal missions, lines of 
authority and responsibility have not been as clear for unique Title 32 state 
requirements.142 Senior Guard leaders contend that Empowerment Act 
legislation gives the Guard the voice it needs in the Pentagon and DoD fears that 
it undermines Total Force are largely overstated, 
The Guard Empowerment Act seeks to close gaps in the 
Department of Defense organization and operations that link with 
state active duty and Title 32 operations and hinder the nation's 
ability to bring critical resources to bear on external and internal 
threats.  It does not seek to create a pseudo-separate service, as 
some have claimed…The adjutants general in no uncertain terms 
want to be different or separate from the Army or Air Force.  We've 
spent nearly 30 years working to operate the same as the active 
component.  We simply desire that the full spectrum of missions 
assigned to the National Guard be fully represented in planning, 
training, and resource allocation.143  
Scholars John Kuehn and Eliot Cohen contend that too much 
centralization in the DoD, as implied by Total Force, can be counterproductive for 
effectiveness and quality of military advice.  Kuehn argues that efforts to unify the 
newly created Department of Defense after WWII, have created an Office of the 
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Secretary of Defense (OSD) that has become so  powerful it “limits or distorts the 
strategic advice available to the Commander in Chief.”144 Cohen also cautioned 
against the "steady movement toward centralization of military authority in large 
staffs."145  Referring specifically to the JCS, Cohen believes too much 
concentration of authority "reduces the sources of military advice for civilian 
authority.  The President and secretary of defense need more than one senior 
military advisor."146  Empowerment Act provisions designating the Chief, NGB as 
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and assigning a Guard general 
officer as NORTHCOM’s Deputy Commander are two methods to broaden 
expertise on Title 32 issues for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS. 
Finally, Total Force integration among the services appears to be largely 
influenced by DoD budget levels.  Interservice cooperation can be seamless 
when resource availability is guaranteed, as historian Michael Doubler recounts 
during the Reagan administration,  
The robust defense budgets of the Reagan Buildup allowed the 
Army and the ARNG to repair much of the damage of the Vietnam, 
guaranteed the success of the volunteer Army and fostered better 
interservice relations.  The Roundout program flourished, and 
ARNG units widened their participation in overseas training 
events…By the late 1980s, the Army and the ARNG had reached 
peak strength levels and enjoyed the best working relations since  
WWII.  For a short span of years, the ARNG seemed to have 
resumed its historical position as the Army's primary combat 
reserve.147 
However, periods of declining budgets have triggered fierce, often public 
competition for resources.  Battles over the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review’s 
recommendations to reduce the Army Guard by 38,000 positions provoked 
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Guard accusations that Army leadership had intentionally “left them out of the 
QDR’s final decision-making process.”148  Congress intervened with proposed 
legislation to promote the Chief, NGB’s position to general and place on the JCS, 
although these provisions were eventually defeated.  Since institutional 
structures direct the competition for resources, both the Guard and regular 
military have a vested interest in how the DoD bureaucracy is arranged, implying 
that “seamless integration” is conditional on availability of resources.  James 
Carafano, a senior researcher with the Heritage Foundation contends that 
“current strains on the Reserve Components can be traced directly to an over-
reliance on policies justified under the Total Force,”149 that contributed to 
“inefficient force structures...insufficient equipment, and inadequate programs for 
efficiently mobilizing and deploying Reserve forces.”150  
D. CONCLUSION 
DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate that unity of effort embodied by 
Total Force concepts is essential for efficient budget, training, and equipping all 
components of the armed services.  
However, critics argue that DoD efforts to redefine the Guard’s roles, 
missions and authorities in the post-9/11 security environment has been hindered 
by its traditional interpretation of Total Force integration which subsumes the 
Guard under the purview of the Army and Air Force. Empowerment Act 
proponents suggest that unity of effort and interdependence were essential and 
necessary in meeting the stable, more predictable threats of the Cold War period.  
But the new security environment demands organizations that can respond and 
react quickly.  Critics argue DoD has been slow to recognize the comparative 
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advantages in broadening the National Guard’s authority and responsibilities for 
leading domestic support operations.  Congress, through Empowerment 
legislation, is redefining Total Force notions of interdependence and integration 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Debates over the National Guard Empowerment Act center on the 
implications of transitioning the Guard's organizational structure, missions, and 
authority to an “operational force.”  The Guard’s sustained overseas deployments 
and accompanying strains on equipment and personnel levels, have diminished 
its capabilities as state militias.  Congress intervened with the National Guard 
Empowerment Act to address competing pressures on Guard readiness and 
compel the DoD to focus more resources and attention on civil support and 
domestic operations.  National security concerns have expanded to include the 
homeland, renewing political interest to ensure the National Guard can mitigate 
terrorist attacks, natural disasters and manmade catastrophes, while still fulfilling 
its operational commitments.  Empowerment legislation intends to recognize the 
Guard’s transition to an operational force by increasing its scope and authority 
overseeing its Title 32 missions. 
Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff contend that current 
stresses on the Guard are not due to lack of influence in DoD hierarchy, but 
years of underfunding following the collapse of the Soviet Union as the nation 
tried to realize a “peace dividend.”  OSD and JCS leaders point out that shrinking 
DoD budgets have impacted all branches and components of the military, not just 
the National Guard.  Army and Air Force leaders further stress that DoD is well 
into the process of revising Cold War policies and structures governing the 
National Guard and must have time to see these initiatives to fruition.  
Empowerment Act critics also charge that too much emphasis on strengthening 
the Guard as a first responder overlooks the responsibilities of other local, state 
and federal agencies.  The National Guard is not intended to be the initial “go-to 
force,” but called in only when local and state resources have been overwhelmed 




to undermine the unity of effort embodied in DoD's Total Force policies, which 
have guided military planning, training and force structure decisions over the past 
thirty years.       
Using new institutionalism theory and principal-agent concepts developed 
by Avant and Feaver, I argue that Congress introduced the National Guard 
Empowerment Act as an instrument to shape DoD policy and priorities giving 
more attention to domestic security and civil support issues.  In addition, the 
Empowerment Act offers valuable electoral incentives for Congressional 
members who will be perceived as “fixing” Guard problems that surfaced during a 
disjointed, confused government response to Hurricane Katrina, strains on 
personnel and equipment from continuous overseas deployments, and 
governors’ complaints of being overlooked in important force structure 
decisions.151  Since Congress and the National Guard have a long tradition of 
political ties, this relationship is mutually beneficial in that the Guard can appeal 
to its allies in Congress over budget and policy disputes with the DoD. 
The Empowerment Act also positions the Guard as a “fire alarm,” 
providing information that can alert Congress if DoD strays from legislative 
priorities.  Provisions for annual reports and elevating Guard officers in DoD and 
NORTHCOM headquarters are methods to assess how well DoD prioritizes, 
plans, and funds military support to civil authorities and other domestic 
operations.  Employing the Guard as a "monitor" on DoD activities effectively 
leverages long-standing tensions between the Guard and regular military 
stemming from competition for resources and relevancy.  
Finally, Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD representatives have repeatedly 
raised concerns that empowerment legislation jeopardizes fundamental Total 
Force principles, meant to integrate regular and reserve forces into a seamless 
force, equally capable, trained and equipped to meet a diverse range of security 
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threats.  Organizational changes mandated by the Empowerment Act are 
considered unnecessary and potentially harmful to Total Force policies, which 
stress integration and interdependence among the service components for 
efficient operations.  Giving the National Guard autonomy over aspects of 
homeland support along with limited budget authority could duplicate efforts, 
confuse lines of authority, and lead to equipment interoperability problems.   
However, DoD’s traditional approach towards Total Force structures and 
hierarchy have contributed to its reluctance to change existing lines of authority 
on behalf of the National Guard.  DoD’s “status quo” position and bureaucratic 
inertia rallied legislators to press for Guard reforms.  More DoD willingness to 
formalize Guard participation in decision-making channels in the early stages of 
the empowerment debates might have defused the acrimony evident in the 
ensuing public hearings.  Despite Secretary Gates’ adopting many of the 
recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, a 
level of distrust had developed between Congress and DoD.  Senators Leahy 
and Bond reintroduced the legislation, noting,  
The Guard is a 21st Century organization, stuck in a 19th Century 
bureaucracy.  The Guard deserves a place at the table when 
decisions…are made that affect its readiness, its missions and its 
effectiveness.  The Guard deserves more than lip service to these 
structural problems.  They deserve action.152 
Debates over “who’s in charge” stem from larger questions concerning the 
competition for resources and the appropriate division of labor for homeland 
defense, civil support and emergency response.153  Total Force policies must be 
reconceived to recognize the Guard’s comparative advantages in domestic 
operations and incorporate its leadership in corresponding DoD and 
NORTHCOM headquarters.   
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Based on political actors' interests, substantial dependence on the Guard 
as an operational reserve, and larger governmental efforts to transform national 
security bureaucracies for the long war on terror, DoD might have preempted 
Congressional intervention by offering their own plan to incorporate Guard 
leadership in selected NORTHCOM and Pentagon structures. However, DoD's 
adherence to "status quo" structures and existing lines of authority precipitated 
Congressional involvement.  Finally, a convincing argument can be made that 
Total Force policies developed under Cold War assumptions must be revisited to 
factor in evolving security concerns and recognize the comparative advantages 
of each service component in meeting domestic and overseas threats.     
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